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International law is part of United States law. Indeed, international
law - or the "law of nations" in eighteenth century parlance - has been
considered part of United States law since the founding., The Judiciary
Act of 1789, the enabling legislation of Article III,2 establishes federal
court jurisdiction over torts committed in violation of the law of nations.
This provision, the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), provides: "[D]istrict
courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a
tort only committed in violation of the law of nations or treaty of the
United States."' Given the paucity of potential claims arising under
eighteenth-century "law of nations," this provision predictably generated
J.D. Candidate, Yale Law School, 1998; Prospective Law Clerk to William C. Canby,
Jr., United states Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Iwant to thank the many who provided
invaluable asistance: David Bederman, Drew S. Days III, Paul Dubinsky, Ryan Goodman, cathy
Ivanic, Harold Hongju Koh, and Ruti Teitel. Finally, I want to dedicate this article to my
mother, Beverly.
1. See Edwin D. Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the
United States, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 26, 55-56 (1952).
[T]he Constitution was framed in firm reliance upon the premise, frequently
articulated, that ... the Law of nations in all its aspects familiar to men of learning in
the eighteenth century was accepted by the framers, expressly or implicitly, as a
constituent part of the national law of the United States ....
2. See Anthony D'Amato, The Alien Tort Statute and the Founding of the Constitution,
82 AM. J. INT'L L. 62 (1988) (describing Judiciary Act as "the structural statutory law of the
new nation" and, with the Constitution, part of the "'organic laws'" of the Founding).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
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few suits through the early years of the republic.4 The shockwaves of Nazi
Germany, the "final solution," and Nuremberg would, however,
fundamentally alter the landscape of international law., Since the end of
World War II, international law has regulated not only relations between
states, but also relations between states and their citizens.6 Individual
human rights are now indisputably part of the transnational legal system.
This development created the juridical space necessary to revive the
ATCA. Given the ever-widening consensus on the legal status of an
inviolable core of international human rights, renewed interest in the
ATCA was arguably inevitable.
Filartigav. Pena-Iralawas the breakthrough case.7 In Filartigaaptly termed the "Brown v. Board of Education of domestic human rights
litigation" 8 - the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that official torture
violates the law of nations, and, therefore, gives rise to an actionable claim
under the ATCA. 9 Confronted with a constitutional challenge to the
ATCA, the Filartiga court also held that Article III permitted such
jurisdiction since the "law of nations," as part of the federal common law,
arises under the laws of the United States.'0 Filartigahas since met with
near uniform approval in the academy" and federal courts. 2 Only Judge

4. Of course, eighteenth century CIL encompassed very few norms. See Tel-Oren v.
Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring). Additionally,
only roughly 15 treaties were in force in 1789. See Kenneth C. Randall, Federal Jurisdiction
Over InternationalLaw Claims: Inquiries into the Alien Tort Statute, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 1, 46 (1985). Many scholars have offered explanations for this initial paucity of ATCA
claims. For a particularly rich account, see Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the
JudiciaryAct of 1789: A Badge of Honor, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 461, 470-71 (1989).
5. See Ruti Teitel, Transitional Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political
Transformation, 106 YALE L.J. 2009, 2038 (1997) (discussing Nuremberg as a "paradigm
shift").
6. See MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 227-40 (1993);
Louis B. Sohn, The New InternationalLaw: Protectionof the Rights of Individuals Rather than
States, 32 AM. U. L. REv. 1-16 (1982).
7. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
8. Harold Hongju Koh, TransnationalPublic Law Litigation, 100 YALE L. J. 2347, 2366
(1991).
9. Filartiga,630 F.2d at 876.
10. Id. at 887 n.20 ("International law has an existence in the federal courts independent
of acts of Congress . . . ."); Id. at 885 ("[T]he law of nations ... has always been part of the
federal common law") (citing The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) and The Neireide,
13 U.S. 388, 423 (1815)).
11. See, e.g, Kathryn Burke, et al., Application of International Human Rights Law in
State and Federal Courts, 18 TEX. INT'L L.J. 291, 321 (1983); Jeffrey M. Blum & Ralph G.
Steinhardt, FederalJurisdictionover InternationalHuman Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims
Act After Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 22 HARV. INT'L L.J. 53, 57, 98-102 (1981); Symposium,
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Bork's now-repudiated concurrence in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic
challenged the Filartigaholding that the ATCA provided a federal cause of
action for certain international human rights violations.'3 In short, a
veritable consensus emerged that some subset of CIL, including certain
international human rights norms, is part of federal common law.
I.

THE REVISIONIST CRITIQUE: WHAT ISTHE STATUS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW INUNITED STATES LAW?
The Filartiga line now faces a new challenge.14 This emergent
challenge to the consensus view, which Ryan Goodman and I have called
the "revisionist position,"' questions the foundations of the Filartiga
holding. This critique claims that the consensus view "is the result of a
combination of troubling developments, including mistaken interpretations
of history, doctrinal bootstrapping by the Restatement (Third) of Foreign

INT'L L. 1 (1981); Symposium: Federal Jurisdiction, Human Rights, and the Law of Nations:
Essays on Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 11 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 305 (1981).
12. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary InternationalLaw as Federal
Common Law: A Critique of the Modem Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 817 (1997)
[hereinafter Customary InternationalLaw] ("[Alimost every federal court that has considered the
modem position has endorsed it.") See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 246 (2d Cir.
1995) (describing the "settled proposition -that federal common law incorporates international
law"), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2524 (1996); In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights
Litig., 978 F.2d 493, 502 (9th Cir. 1992) ("It is ... well settled that the law of nations is part
of federal common law."); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 193 (D. Mass. 1995) ("It is
well settled that the body of principles that comprise customary international law is subsumed
and incorporated by federal common law."); In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights
Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1473, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994); Filartiga,630 F.2d 876, 885; Xuncax, 886 F.
Supp. 162, 193; United States v. Schiffer, 836 F. Supp. 1164, 1170 (E.D. Pa. 1993), aff'd, 31
F.3d 1175 (3d Cir. 1994); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1544 (N.D. Cal. 1987),
reh'g granted on other grounds 694 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Cal. 1988); Fernandez v. Wilkinson,
505 F. Supp. 787, 798 (D. Kan. 1980), aff'd on other grounds 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981).
13. Tel-Oren 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring). See also Michael
Ratner & Beth Stephens, lyrants, Terrorists and Torturers Brought to Justice; United States
Courts Provide Compensationfor Victim, NEW YORK L.J., May 15, 1995, at S5. ("Judge Bork's
opinion is the only judicial opinion calling Filartigainto question. Since then every decision has
supported the result reached in Filartiga;most have awarded substantial damages.").
14. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 12; Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The
CurrentIllegitimacy of Human Rights Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 319 (1997) [hereinafter
Human Rights Litigation]; see also Arthur M. Weisburd, State Courts, Federal Courts, and
International Cases, 20 YALE J. INT'LL. 1 (1995); Arthur M. Weisburd, The Executive Branch
and InternationalLaw, 41 VAND. L. REV. 1205 (1988); Phillip R. Trimble, A Revisionist View
of Customary InternationalLaw, 33 UCLA L. REV. 665 (1986).
15. See Ryan Goodman & Derek P. Jinks, Filartiga'sFirm Footing: Federal Common Law
and InternationalHuman Rights, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 463, 469 (1997).
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Relations Law, and academic fiat."16 Professors Curtis Bradley and Jack
Goldsmith suggest that -

contrary to Filartiga'sholding -

CIL is not

federal law absent political branch authorization and, as a consequence,
federal courts should have limited, if any, jurisdiction over claims arising
under CIL." Furthermore, the revisionists argue that if CIL is not part of
federal common law, ATCA suits between non-citizens would be
unconstitutional for failure to fit under any of Article III's provisions.
Indeed, the doctrinal consequences of the revisionist critique are potentially
crippling for the Filartigaline.
The normative force of the revisionist position rests on two related
concerns. First, the revisionists suggest that international law increasingly
regulates "many areas that were formerly of exclusive domestic concern."' 8
Second, the revisionists decry the "new CIL,"' 9 which governs a broad
range of juridical relationships,20 emerges quickly,2 ' and is less consentbased than traditional CIL. 2 Thus, the revisionists conclude that the "new
CIL" has many potentially troubling doctrinal implications: federal CIL
might preempt an unacceptably broad range of state laws;23 federal CIL
might involve federal courts in issues best left to the political branches;'
and federal CIL might potentially invalidate inconsistent, democraticallyproduced United States political branch action.Y Under the revisionist
view, these concerns counsel against the wholesale incorporation of CIL
16. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 821.
17. A word on the parameters of my analysis is in order. First, in this short presentation,
I will not provide an in-depth explication of Bradley and Goldsmith's position. For a summary
of their argument, see Goodman & Jinks, supra note 15, at 470-79. The steps of the argument
are far more nuanced than I will discuss, however, the objections I raise here center on the
applicability of this critique to ongoing ATCA litigation. Second, I will not discuss the
implications of the Torture Victim Protection Act. For an excellent, succinct discussion of the
TVPA's relevance to this debate, see Ryan Goodman, Congressional Support for Customary
International Human Rights Law as Federal Common Law: Lessons of the Torture Victim
ProtectionAct, 4 ILSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. (forthcoming 1998). This short Article draws on a

more extended piece I co-authored with Ryan Goodman, supra note 15. Article written by Ryan
Goodman and I. See Ryan Goodman & Derek P. Jinks, Filartiga'sFirm Footing: Federal
Common Law and InternationalHuman Rights, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. (forthcoming 1997). This
piece summarizes one of the arguments we advance in that Article.

18. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 821.
19. See id. at 838-42.
20. See id. at 839-40.
21. See id. at 840-41.

22. See id. at 841-42.
23. See id. at 846-47.
24. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 844-46.
25. Id. at 857-58. 868-69.
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into federal common law. Bradley and Goldsmith thus conclude that
absent political branch authorization, CIL is not federal law.26
Although the revisionist position can, and has been, discredited
along many fronts, I focus here on one argument.27 My claim is that close
examination of actual judicial practice deprives the revisionist critique of
all normative force. Federal courts do not incorporate the "new CIL"
without a searching inquiry that satisfies the revisionist concerns over
democracy, separation of powers, and federalism. Thus, the actual nature
of judicial inquiries and the resultant findings merit further inspection.
II.

INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN UNITED STATES
COURTS: THE STRUCTURE OF ATCA LITIGATION

The structure of controlling case law lends little support to the
revisionist critique. Indeed, the revisionist critique cautions against the
wholesale incorporation of CIL into federal common law without ever
analyzing the categories of CIL norms that courts actually deem judicially
cognizable. The structure of current ATCA litigation supports two related
conclusions. First, federal courts have developed a rigorous analytical
framework delimiting the application of international law in United States
courts; and second, this framework has, in practice, recognized a set of
wholly unobjectionable CIL claims. In short, the Filartiga line of cases
appropriately fashions a federal common law of universal human rights
norms.
Federal courts utilize a stringent tripartite test for assessing
whether an alleged act constitutes an actionable CIL claim. Filartiga
established that, under the ATCA, judicially cognizable CIL must be 1)
universal; 2) obligatory (as opposed to hortatory or aspirational); and 3)
definable." This tripartite test effectively limits the range of actionable
26. See id. at 868, 870; Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 15, at 1.
27. Many commentators have provided sound critiques of the revisionist position. See
Harold Hongju Koh, Is InternationalLaw Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming
1998); Goodman, supra note 17; Goodman & Jinks, supra note 17; Gerald L. Neuman, Sense
and Nonsense About Customary International Law: A Response to Professors Bradley and
Goldsmith, 66 FORD. L. REv. 371 (1997); Beth Stephens, Law of Our Land Customary
InternationalLaw as FederalLaw After Erie, 66 FORD. L. REV. 393 (1997).
28. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 885-87; see also In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human
Rights Litigation II, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Filartiga,630 F.2d at 885-87)
("We thus join the Second Circuit in concluding that the Alien Tort Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350
(1982), creates a cause of action for violations of specific, universal and obligatory international
human rights standards . . . ."); Forti v. Suarez-Mason I, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1539-40 (N.D.
Cal. 1987) (citing Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881) (other citations omitted) ("The contours of the
requirement have been delineated by the Filartigacourt and by Judge Edwards in Tel-Oren ....
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claims to a small subset of CIL, namely, jus cogens (or "compelling law")
norms. Therefore, successful ATCA plaintiffs must raise claims based on
jus cogens norms, 29 a short list of settled, peremptory norms. 0

Accordingly, the three prongs of the ATCA's "jus cogens test" 3' enable a
delimited but fundamentally important category of legal norms to succeed.
Discernible patterns have emerged in ATCA litigation. Utilizing
the "jus cogens test," federal courts have identified some clearly actionable
CIL norms including: genocide,3 2 official torture, extra-judicial killing,3 '
This 'international tort' must be one which is definable, obligatory (rather then hortatory), and
universally condemned."); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 184 (1995).
29. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 39th Sess., art. 53, U.N. Doc.
A/39127 (1969); Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 715 (9th Cir. 1992)
("[Jus cogens 'embraces customary laws considered binding on all nations,' and 'is derived
from values taken to be fundamental by the international community, rather than from the
fortuitous or self-interested choices of nations.'") (quoting David F. Klein, A Theory for the
Application of the Customary InternationalLaw of Human Rights by Domestic Courts, 13 YALE
J. INT'L L. 332, 350-51 (1988); RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 102 cmt. K 1987;
Craig Scott, et al., A Memorialfor Bosnia, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 28 (1994) (Jus cogens norms
"derive from principles that the legal conscience of humankind deems essential to coexistence in
the international community.").
30. The notion of jus cogens employed in ATCA litigation closely tracks, but does not
mirror, the conventional understanding of this term in public international law. See, e.g.,
Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 184 (1995) (drawing on notion of non-derogability in
holding that "the prohibition against [the action] is non-derogable and therefore binding at all
times upon all actors."); Doe v. Unocal, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5094, *27 (C.D. Cal. March
25, 1997) ("Under the ATCA, jurisdiction may be based on a violation of a jus cogens norm
which enjoys the highest status within international law.") (citations omitted); In re Estate of
Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litigation I, 978 F.2d 493, 503 (9th Cir. 1992) (involving suit
of wrongful death "by official torture in violation of jus cogens norm of international law,
properly invokes the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts under § 1350"); Siderman v.
Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 717 (9th Cir. 1992) ("In Filartiga, though the court was not explicitly
considering jus cogens, Judge Kaufman's survey of the universal condemnation of torture
provides much support for the view that torture violates jus cogens.").
31. Ryan Goodman and I have elsewhere described the contours of the "jus cogens test" in
some detail. See Goodman & Jinks, supra note 15, at 494-511.
32. See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadic, 70 F.3d 232 (2nd Cir. 1996); Beanal v. FreeportMcMoran, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4767, *19-21 (E.D. La. Apr. 9, 1997); Mushikiwabo v.
Berayagwiza, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4409, *34 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 1996).
33. See, e.g., Filartiga, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2nd Cir, 1980) ("inhere are few, if any,
issues in international law today on which opinion seems to be so united as the limitations on a
state's power to torture persons held in its custody."); Cabiri v. Assasie-Gyimah, 921 F.Supp.
1189,1196 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (alleging acts of the defendant violated "a fundamental principle of
the law of nations: the human right to be free from torture"); In re Estate of FerdinandMarcos,
978 F.2d 493, 498 (citing Siderman v. Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 717 (9th Cir. 1992))
(explaining that it is "'unthinkable'" to hold that official torture does not violate customary
international law); Forti, 672 F.Supp. 1531, 1541 (expressing "no doubt" that official torture is
cognizable §1350 violation of law of nations).
34. See, eg., Forti, 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Xuncax, 886 F. Supp 162, 185.
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disappearances," and prolonged arbitrary detention. 6 Likewise the federal
courts have uniformly rejected a (much broader) range of CIL. Note that
many of these norms are arguably CIL, but they fail to meet the "jus
cogens test." The list of unsuccessful claims includes: expropriation of
property,3' fraud, 11negligence in aircraft crashes3' and mismanaged sea

mhe practices of summary execution ... have been met with universal condemnation
and opprobrium.... An affidavit signed by twenty-seven widely respected scholars of
international law attests that every instrument or agreement that has attempted to define
the scope of international human rights has 'recognized a right to life coupled with a
right to due process to protect that right.' And again, not only are the proscriptions of
these acts universal and obligatory, they are adequately defined to encompass the
instant allegations. (citations omitted ).
35. See, e.g., Forti, 694 F.Supp 707; Xuncax, 886 F.Supp. 162, 185.
36. See, e.g., Forti, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1541-42 (holding that prolonged arbitrary
detention has "sufficient consensus.., is obligatory, and is readily definable."
37. See, e.g., Jafari v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 539 F.Supp 209, 214-15 (N.D. I11.1982);
Guinto v. Marcos, 654 F. Supp. 276 n. 1 (S.D. Cal. 1986) ("While there is no consensus on what
constitutes a violation of the 'law of nations,' in one area there appears to be a consensus. A
taking or expropriation of a foreign national's property by his government is not cognizable
under § 1350.")
38. See Trans-Continental Investment Corp., S.A. v. Bank of the Commonwealth, 500 F.
Supp. 565 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (concerning fraudulent misrepresentation to receive $2.5 million
deposit in bank); lIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2nd Cir. 1975) (involving action for
fraud, conversion, and corporate waste); Abiodun v. Martin Oil Service, Inc., 475 F.2d 142 (7th
Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (involving fraud in procuring workers from foreign country).
39. See Benjamin v. British Europena Airways, 572 F.2d 913, 916 (2nd Cir. 1978)
(finding that no evidence supports the claim that negligence constitutes law of nations violation).
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custody law,' 3 and financial

misconduct."
The degree of consensus in ATCA litigation is remarkable.
Indeed, federal courts are divided on the status of only one CIL norm: the
prohibition of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. While the norm
clearly satisfies the requirements of universal condemnation and obligatory
prohibition, federal courts have disagreed about the definability of the
norm.'

5

Significantly, federal courts have closely guarded against any
unwarranted expansion of the jus cogens category." The range of potential
jus cogens violations are, of course, not a fixed set. Other norms may at
some point assume the character of a universal, obligatory norm, and
40. See Damaskinos v. Societa Navigacion Interamericana, S.A., Pan., 255 F. Supp. 919,
923 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) ("Negligence in providing a seaman with a safe place in which to work,
and unseaworthiness of a vessel in that respect, are not violations of the law of nations."); Lopes
v. Reederei Richard Schroder, 225 F.Supp. 292, 294-95 (E.D. Pa. 1963) (stating doctrine of
unseaworthiness that allowed compensation for seamen beyond maintenance and cure was
particular American principle not found under law of nations); see also Khedivial Line, S.A.E.
v. Seafarers' Int'l Union, 278 F.2d 49, 51-52 (2nd Cir. 1960) (per curiam) (denying ATCA
jurisdiction because unrestricted right of access to harbors by vessels of all nations not a part of
law of nations).
41. See Guinto, 654 F. Supp. 276, 280 ("However dearly our country holds First
Amendment rights ... a violation of the First Amendment right of free speech does not rise to
the level of such universally recognized rights and so does not constitute a 'law of nations.'").
42. See Akbar v. New York Magazine Co., 490 F.Supp 60, 63 (D.C.C. 1980) ("No treaty
concerning libel has been noted nor allegedly violated, and plaintiffs have hot alleged any
violation of "ti.t law of nations" as the term has been interpreted by the courts.").
43. See, e.g., Huynh Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625, 630 (6th Cir. 1978) ("[The 'law of
nations,' to the extent that it speaks on the subject, does not demand a particular substantive rule
regarding custody of alien children.").
44. See Valanga v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 259 F.Supp 324, 328 (E.D.Pa. 1966)
(refusal of life insurance company to pay proceeds is not law of nations violation nor approaches
the calibre of cases legitimately found under § 1350); cf. Cohen v. Hartman 634 F.2d 318, 319
(5th Cir. 1981) (holding that converted funds between employer and employee does not involve:
a) internal relations nor; b) affect national sovereignty and thus in no way a law of nations
violation).
45. One court has rejected such claims. See Forti v. Suarez-Mason I, 672 F. Supp. 1531,
1539-40 (N.D. Cal. 1987) ("Because this right lacks readily ascertainable parameters, it is
unclear what behavior falls within the proscription .

. .

. Lacking the requisite elements of

universality and definability, this proposed tort cannot qualify as a violation of the law of
nations.") Conversely, one federal court, after considering the reasoning of the Ford court,
allowed the claim. See Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. 162, 187.
46. See, e.g., Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. 162, 189 ("[C]aution is required in identifying new
violations of jus cogens."); Forti1, 672 F.Supp, at 1542-43 ("Before this Court may adjudicate a
court claim under §1350, it must be satisfied that the legal standard it is to apply his one with
universal acceptance and definition; on no other bases may the Court exercise jurisdiction over a
claimed violation of the law of nations.').
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definable. This is the nature of an evolving legal order. Nevertheless,
federal courts have clearly exercised great caution in determining whether
an alleged offense constitutes such a violation.
III. RETHINKING REVISIONISM: THE LESSONS OF THE ATCA
LITIGATION "
Several lessons can be gleaned from the Filartigacase line. First,
the structure of the litigation underscores the distinction between CIL, in
general, and actionable CIL. The potentially troubling features of the new
CIL, while thought-provoking, are largely irrelevant to the ATCA line.
Second, prevailing judicial practice demonstrates the systematicity of the
Filartiga line.
The uniform results in the case law eviscerate the
importance of the revisionist charge that CIL is "often unwritten .
unsettled . . . difficult to verify;"" the "contours [of which] are often
uncertain."48
At worst, such characterizations might be relevant to
borderline inquires.
However, these characteristics cannot be fairly
attributed to justiciable or jus cogens CIL. Components of CIL that are
"difficult to verify" or "uncertain" simply do not survive the rigorous
standard articulated by federal courts.
Finally, the specific norms that federal courts have incorporated genocide and torture for example - are decidedly unobjectionable.
Bradley and Goldsmith refer only to deeply disputed norms, such as the
death penalty, when articulating the dangers of the Filartigaline. Their
critique, however, is not persuasive when applied to genocide, torture, or
summary executions. The illegal character of these actions is beyond
reproach. With respect to this category of CIL, it seems absurd to suggest
that the incorporation of such norms produces anti-democratic outcomes
frustrating the legitimate ambitions of states or the electorate.
The structural concerns that animate the revisionist critique simply
do not implicate the current international human rights litigation. In this
sense, Bradley and Goldsmith are tilting at windmills. The incorporation
of CIL takes place against the backdrop of many jurisprudential and
institutional safeguards designed to frustrate the wholesale incorporationof
CIL. At a minimum, the revisionist challenge loses all persuasive appeal
when applied to the ATCA litigation. Indeed, the Filartiga line has
appropriately fashioned a federal common law of universal, obligatory, and
definable human rights norms.

47. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 855.
48. Id. at 858.

